NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-PREFERENTIAL QUOTA ON HIRING AND

PROMOTION HELD TO BE AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
PAST DISCRIMINATORY

EMPLOYMENT

REMEDY FOR

PRACTICES IN NEW JER-

SEY-Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5, 367 A.2d 833 (1976).
Charles S. Lige, a black man, seeking a position with the Montclair, New Jersey Fire Department, took a written test, administered
by that town on November 6, 1971, as the first phase in the process
of selecting candidates for Montclair's fire-fighting force.' As Lige did
not perform satisfactorily, his application was rejected. 2 He subsequently filed a complaint with the Division on Civil Rights of the
New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety (Division), alleging that the test and other selection procedures employed by the
town " '[were] fair in form but discriminatory in operation,' " and that
I Lige

v. Town of Montclair, Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law of Hearing Examiner Julius Wildstein, State of New Jersey Department of Law &
Public Safety, Division on Civil Rights, Docket Nos. EG13RM-6282, -6833, at 4 (May
16, 1964) [hereinafter cited as Recommended Findings], adopted by the Directorof the
Division on Civil Rights; see Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5, 13, 367 A.2d 833, 837
(1976). Lige and 57 other men aspiring to become members of the Montclair Police or
Fire Departments were administered identical examinations. 72 N.J. at 7-8, 367 A.2d at
834. The hearing examiner found that the test was not professionally validated or otherwise indicative of those qualities necessary to perform the work of police officers or firefighters. Recommended Findings at 44.
For a discussion of the legal issues raised by challenges to employment testing,
see Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598
(1969); Note, Employment Testing: The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 72
COLUM. L. REV. 900 (1972).
2 Recommended Findings, supra note 1, at 6.
If an applicant scored at least 17 points on the written exam and fell within the 75th
percentile of applicants tested, he would be screened to determine police record, residency and health. See id. at 7-8. Lige's actual score on the written test was not disclosed in the Recommended Findings. It was found, however, that Lige, who had
graduated from high school and had completed one year of college, did not meet the
minimum requirements necessary to be considered for screening. id. at 6. If successful
in the testing and screening phases, the applicant would proceed to the next stage of
the selection process, which involved an appearance before a five member examining
board comprised of town residents of various professions, who possessed no particular
expertise in municipal hiring. Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5, 8, 367 A.2d 833, 834
(1976). The board, bound by no standard guidelines, would then make recommendations to the Montclair commissioner of public safety who was vested with "unrestricted
discretion" in making the ultimate determination regarding hiring. Id.
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the test "had an unlawful discriminatory effect on black applicants and
was not properly designed to measure the traits necessary for successful performance" with respect to the positions sought to be filled. 3
The Lige complaint was first heard at the administrative level,
where the hearing examiner 4 determined that the town's selection
3 Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5, 6-7, 367 A.2d 833, 833-34 (1976). The original complaint had been filed with the Division on December 27, 1971. Petition for
Certification at 1, Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5, 367 A.2d 833 (1976). That complaint charged that the town had violated the Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -38 (West 1976). The complaint alleged specific violations of §§ 10:5-4
and -12(a). Recommended Findings, supra note 1, at 2-4. Section 10:5-4 provides in
relevant part:
All persons shall have the opportunity to obtain employment . . . without
discrimination because of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status or sex, subject only to conditions and limitations applicable alike to all
persons. This opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.
Section 10:5-12 provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice, or, as the case may be, an
unlawful discrimination:
(a) For an employer, because of the race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status or sex of any individual . . .to refuse to hire or employ or bar or discharge from employment such individual or to discriminate
against such individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of
employment....
In amendments to the original complaint, filed with the Division on August 10, and
November 15, 1973, Lige, joined by the Director of the Division, charged that the
police and fire department entrance exam "had a disparate effect on black applicants."
Petition for Certification at 1, Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5, 367 A.2d 833 (1976).
It was further charged that the test "had an unlawful potential to discriminate" because
the test was neither professionally validated nor job related. Lige v. Town of Montclair,
72 N.J. 5, 6-7, 367 A.2d 833, 834 (1976).
On June 14, 1972, the Director filed a separate complaint against Montclair, charging that the testing procedure used to select candidates for promotion within the police
and fire departments was also discriminatory against blacks and other minorities. Recommended Findings, supra at 2, 4. The two complaints, as amended, were consolidated
into one action for the administrative hearing. Id. at 2.
Montclair stated at the hearing that there were no acts of discrimination on the part
of its department of public safety, which administered the tests and screening procedures, id. at 5, even though intent to discriminate was not charged. Id. In fact, the
hearing examiner suggested that the Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-1 to -38 (West 1976), does not require a showing of intent before an employer
may be found guilty of an unlawful discriminatory employment practice. Recommended
Findings, supra at 20-21. (relying upon Blair v. Mayor and Council, Borough of Freehold, 117 N.J. Super. 415, 417, 285 A.2d 46, 47-48 (App. Div. 1971)).
4 Recommended Findings, supra note 1, at 1; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-8(l) (West
1976).
The Law Against Discrimination, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1 to -38 (West 1976),
provides for the hearing of any complaint by the Division, if, in the opinion of the
Attorney General (or his designate), "circumstances so warrant." Id. § 10:5-15. Section
10:5-16 requires that the controversy "be presented before the director," who acts as a
delegate of the Attorney General pursuant to § 10:5-8(d). The Director, in turn, may
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procedure for fire personnel discriminated against minority applicants
5
and thus violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD).
Based on this finding, the Director of the Division (Director) issued
an order which required, inter alia, that Montclair institute a hiring
plan for police and fire personnel based on a racial quota system. 6
Specifically, the Director ordered that "[ojne . . . qualified minority
applicant shall be selected for every one . . . qualified white applicant
until the total number of minority officers on the Fire Department
7
equals at least fifteen . . . persons."

designate a hearing examiner from a pool of attorneys licensed to practice in New Jersey and selected for the express purpose of conducting hearings to "recommend findings of fact and conclusions of law." Id. § 10:5-8(l). The final determination, however, is
made by the Director who may choose to accept or reject the hearing examiner's recommendations. See id. §§ 10:5-8(l), -17.
5 Recommended Findings, supra note 1, at 43-46; see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-1
to -38 (West 1976).
Specifically, the hearing examiner recommended the following findings of fact: (1)
The Town of Montclair was an employer as defined by the Law Against Discrimination
and was required to comply with it; (2) Lige was not hired as a result of his performance
on an unlawfully discriminatory employment test; (3) the test used for promotions was
likewise unlawfully discriminatory; (4) the post-test hiring procedures violated the Law
Against Discrimination in that the local examining hoard utilized no formal guidelines
in evaluating applicants, and the appearance before that hoard bore no rational relationship to job performance; (5) the procedures involved in promotion were violative of the
Law Against Discrimination for the same reasons applicable to post-test hiring procedures. Recommended Findings, sopra at 44-46.
6 Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5, 13-14, 367 A.2d 833, 837 (1976).
The final order of the Director required the town to terminate all testing "until
professionally validated and approved by the Division." Id. at 13, 367 A.2d at 837. The
use of oral interviews in the third step of the selection process was also to be discontinned. Id. The Director further ordered the town to reevaluate Lige and the other applicants who took the November 6, 1971 test, as well as the black members of the police
and fire divisions who were denied promotions in 1971, by "[nIondiscriminatory selection and promotion methods . . . subject to the Director's approval." Id.
While the hearing examiner made recommendations to the Director, he did not
explicitly recommend the implementation of a quota system. See Recommended Findings, supra note 1, at 46. In his recommended findings the hearing examiner concluded:
[A]n order could include a requirement that the respondents cease and desist
from the use of any examination which has not been properly professionally
validated and from the use of supervisory evaluations, oral interviews and absolute discretion by the director of the department without effective standards
and protections against racial discrimination. Such an order could also provide
for the respondents to take appropriate affirmative action to minimize the pos-

sible future effects of practices which have in the past resulted in racial discrioinations.

Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added).
7 Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5, 13-14, 367 A.2d 833, 837 (1976). The Director's order also imposed remedial quota relief on departmental promotions. Id. at 14,
367 A.2d at 837. That portion of the order required that
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Montclair appealed that portion of the Director's order on the
8
grounds that the imposed hiring and promotion quotas were invalid.
The New Jersey superior court, appellate division, struck the quotas from the order, holding that such relief was contrary to both the
state and federal constitutions and was beyond the statutory power of
the Division on Civil Rights. 9
The Division's petition for certification was granted' 0 and the
New Jersey supreme court affirmed the decision of the appellate
division in Lige v. Town of Montclair.x l Therein, New Jersey's highest court held that the use of racial quotas violates article I, paragraph 5 of the New Jersey constitution.' 2 In addition, the court
agreed with the appellate division that the Director had exceeded
his statutory authority. 13 Justice Pashman filed a dissenting opinion' 4
in which he criticized the majority for interpreting the state constitution "more stringently than the Fourteenth Amendment,"' 15 and
analogized this case to federal cases which had upheld racial quotas.16
The impact of Lige on civil rights litigation and employment discrimination remedies in New Jersey can be best understood by first
examining the statutory and constitutional foundations of the decision.
This Note will focus upon the equal protection aspects of the state
constitution and the Law Against Discrimination. These will be com"[fluture promotions in the Montclair Police Department shall be made on
the following basis:
One qualified Black applicant shall be promoted for every one qualified
white applicant until 50% of those minority applicants deemed qualified by the
re-evaluation have been promoted."

id.
8 Lige v. Town of Montclair, 134 N.J. Super. 277, 278, 340 A.2d 660, 661 (App. Div.
1975), aff'd, 72 N.J. 5, 367 A.2d 833 (1976). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-21 (West 1976) provides that any "aggrieved" person may appeal the Director's final order to the appellate
division of the superior court in the same manner "as an appeal from a State administrative agency." The court rules provide for an appeal as of right from a final determination
of an administrative agency. N.J.R. 2:2-3(a)(2).
Montclair did not appeal those portions of the order which required the termination
of all invalidated testing because it had revised the tests and other selection procedures.
Lige v. Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. 5, 14, 367 A.2d 833, 837-38 (1976).
9Lige v. Town of Montclair, 134 N.J. Super. 277, 282, 340 A.2d 660, 663 (App. Div.
1975), aff'd, 72 N.J. 5, 367 A.2d 833 (1976).
10Lige v. Township of Montclair, 68 N.J. 490, 348 A.2d 531 (1975).
11 72 N.J. 5, 367 A.2d 833 (1976).
12 Id. at 26, 367 A.2d at 844.
13Id. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-2 provides guidelines for the construction of the LAD:
"Nothing contained in this act . . . shall be construed to require or authorize any act
prohibited by law."
14 72 N.J. at 27, 367 A.2d at 845.
15 Id. at 54, 367 A.2d at 859.
16 Id. at 52-62, 367 A.2d at 858-63.
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pared with the United States Constitution and federal civil rights
legislation which have been interpreted as permitting a wider range
of affirmative action remedies.
Article I, paragraph 5 of the New Jersey constitution, which was
central to the Lige holding, states:
No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right, nor be discriminated against in the exercise of any civil
or military right, nor be segregated in the militia or in the public
schools, because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national origin.
This section was added to the 1947 constitution in an apparent attempt to give a constitutional basis to the anti-discrimination princi-

ples expressed two years earlier in the LAD. 17 In construing this
provision, the New Jersey supreme court has said: "Effectuation of
[the constitutional] mandate calls for liberal interpretation of any
18
legislative enactment designed to implement it.'
In Morean v. Board of Education,19 for example, the New Jersey
supreme court upheld what was alleged to be " 'a double standard of
school assignment' "20 utilized by the Montclair Board of Education
as part of a student relocation plan. 2 1 The plan was challenged as
being " 'racially motivated . ..and therefore violat[ive] [of] the equal
protection' " clause of the Federal Constitution. 22 Most school assignments were made pursuant to a "neighborhood school policy"; but in
order to avoid racial imbalance, certain black students were allowed
to attend schools beyond their neighborhood.2 3 The court noted that
a school board could not "close its eyes to racial imbalance,- 24 even

17See III

STATE OF NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF

1947 (Commit-

tee on Rights, Privileges, Amendments and Miscellaneous Provisions and Committee on
the Legislative Record) 344-45.
18 Levitt & Sons, Inc. v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 524, 158 A.2d
177, 182, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418 (1960).
1942 N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97 (1964).
20 Id. at 241, 200 A.2d at 99.
21 Id. at 243-44, 200 A.2d at 100. In an effort to reduce expenses, Montclair instituted a plan to consolidate its four junior high schools into one centrally located school.
Id. at 238-39, 200 A.2d at 97-98. In the interim, the school board decided to eliminate
the most costly of the four schools, Glenfield. Id. In order to prevent this temporary
measure from effecting de facto segregation, the Glenfield student body, which was
90% black, was divided and reassigned to one of the three remaining schools, Hillside
(60% black), George Inness (18% black), or Mt. Hebron (no blacks). Id. at 239-42, 200
A.2d at 98-100.
22 Id. at 242, 200 A.2d at 99.
23 Id. at 241, 200 A.2d at 99.
24 Id. at 243, 200 A.2d at 100.
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when the only remedy for this situation calls for color conscious relief.25 Although "[c]onstitutional color blindness may be wholly apt
when the frame of reference is an attack on official efforts toward segregation; it is not generally apt when the attack is on official efforts
26
toward the avoidance of segregation."
This racial awareness policy has been recognized by the court
as having "gained wide acceptance ' 27 as a legitimate, at times indispensible, tool in eliminating the effects of past discrimination. 2 8 The
supreme court has maintained that "those who seek to end racial discrimination must often be acutely color conscious." 29 A prime example of a situation in which the supreme court determined that the
state constitution posed no bar to color conscious official action appears in Jenkins v. Township of Morris School District.30 The issue in
Jenkins was whether the state commissioner of education had the
power to eliminate de facto segregation by effectuating a merger of
two adjacent, vet racially dissimilar school svstems. 3 1 The conflict
arose when the Township of Morris voted not to renew a sending32
receiving agreement with their encircled neighbor, Morristown.
This agreement had allowed the township, which had no high school
of its own, to send its high school age children to the town's school,
Morristown High School. 33 Since most of the area's black population
resided in Morristown, 3" a withdrawal by the Township of Morris
would have reduced the number of " 'highly-motivated,' "35 white,
middle class students, and commensurately increased the percentage
36
of lower class black students attending Morristown High School.
Appellants petitioned the state commissioner of education to prevent
the withdrawal of Township of Morris students and to "effectuat[e] a
25 Id. at 242, 200 A.2d at 100.
26 Id. at 243-44, 200 A.2d at 100.
27

New Jersey Builders, Owners and Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 336, 288

A.2d 855, 858 (1972); see notes 50-59 infra and accompanying text.
28 New Jersey Builders, Owners and Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 336, 288
A.2d 855, 858 (1972).
29

Id.

30 58 N.J. 483, 279 A.2d 619 (1971).
31 Id. at 485, 279 A.2d at 620.

Id. at 491-92, 279 A.2d at 624.
Id. at 488, 279 A.2d at 622.
34 Id. at 487, 279 A.2d at 621. In 1971, only 5% of Morris Township's 20,000 inhabitants were black. In contrast, approximately 25% of Morristown's 18,000 residents
were black. Id.
35 Id. at 490, 279 A.2d at 622. The court quoted from findings of the N.J. Dep't of
Education Hearing Examiner which "were adopted by the Commissioner of Education
in his decision." Id. at 487, 279 A.2d at 621.
36 See id. at 487-88, 279 A,2d at 621-22.
32
33
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merger of the Morris Township and Morristown school systems." 37
Although the commissioner recognized that the requested relief
"[was] highly desirable from an educational standpoint and [would]
avoid racial imbalance," 38 he perceived such relief to be beyond the
pale of his authority. 39 The supreme court determined, however, that
he had the power to forestall the withdrawal and effectuate a
merger.4 0 In arriving at this conclusion, the court looked to article I,
paragraph 5,41 and article VIII, section 4, paragraph 1, which require
"a thorough and efficient system of free public schools." 4 2 These provisions, along with various statutes enacted pursuant thereto, were
held to be directed toward the prevention of future, and the remedy
of past and present, racial imbalance. 43 11 1971, it was clear to the
court that "if... the educational and racial policies embodied in our
State Constitution and its implementing legislation . . . are to be at

all meaningful, the State Commissioner must have [the] power" to
44
take appropriate action through racially motivated relief.
The New Jersey legislature's response to discriminatory practices took substantive form as the Law Against Discrimination. 4 5 The

LAD was enacted in 1945 to counteract the perceived threat to "democratic" ideals posed by invidious forms of discrimination, 4 6 and included an open-ended provision empowering the Director4 7 to order
37 Id. at 485, 279 A.2d at 620.
38 Id.

39 Id.
40 Id. at 508, 279 A.2d at 632-33.
41 Id. at 496, 279 A.2d at 626.
42 Id. at 494, 279 A.2d at 625.
43 See id. at 493-501, 279 A.2d at 625-29.
44 Id. at 501, 279 A.2d at 629.
45 Law Against Discrimination, 1945 N.J. Laws, ch. 169 (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-1 to -38 (West 1976)).
46 1945 N.J. Laws, ch. 169, § 3 (presently codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-3 (West
1976)).
Originally, the LAD merely prohibited discrimination in employment. 1945 N.J.
Laws, ch. 169, § 4. Over the years, however, the LAD has undergone a number of
revisions designed to expand the act's application. 1949 N.J. Laws, ch. 11, sec. 2
(amending § 4 to prohibit discrimination in public accomodation); 1961 N.J. Laws, ch.
106, sec. 1 (amending § 4 to include certain classes of private housing); 1962 N.J. Laws,
ch. 37, sec. 3 (amending § 4 to include prohibition of age discrimination); 1970 N.J.
Laws, ch. 80, sec. 9 (amending § 4 to include prohibition of discrimination based upon
marital status or sex).
47 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-17 (West 1976). Originally, enforcement authority was vested in the Commissioner of Education. 1945 N.J. Laws, ch. 169, § 16, at 596. The 1963
amendments to the LAD transferred responsibility for enforcement from the Department
of Education to the Department of Law and Public Safety. 1963 N.J. Laws, ch. 40,
§§ 2-11, at 127-33.
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"such affirmative action" as necessary to "effectuate the purpose of
48
th[e] act."
A broad spectrum of remedial action pursuant to the LAD has
been approved by the supreme court, which traditionally has given
the act an interpretation which would best implement its underlying
policy. 4 9 For example, in New Jersey Builders, Owners and Managers Association v. Blair,50 the supreme court was faced with a challenge to the validity of a rule promulgated by the Division which the
petitioners claimed was offensive to the very statute it sought to
implement. 5 1 In question was the Multiple Dwelling Reporting
Rule, 52 which requires owners of certain multiple dwellings to submit
an annual report, consisting of the racial classification of their present
and prospective tenants, to the Division. 5 3 The LAD, however, prohibits any person who sells or rents real estate from making or posting any lists or "mak[ing] any ... inquiry . . . as to [the] race, creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, marital status or sex" of any tenant or
prospective tenant.5 4 Thus, New Jersey Builders argued that the
48

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-17 (West 1976).

19 See, e.g., Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N.J. 474, 308 A.2d 649 (1973) (Director's
order prohibiting sex segregated classified employment advertising not an abridgement
of freedom of press and within regulatory power of the Division); Jackson v. Concord
Co., 54 N.J. 113, 253 A.2d 793 (1969) (award of compensatory damages to complainant
injured by landlord's refusal to rent on basis of race), discussed at notes 60-69 infra and
accompanying text; David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345 (1965) (sale and rental
of private housing within jurisdiction of Division to prevent discrimination); Fraser v.
Robin Dee Day Camp, 44 N.J. 480, 210 A.2d 208 (1965) (Division order requiring day
camp to terminate discriminatory enrollment policy valid and within intended scope of
LAD).
50 60 N.J. 330, 288 A.2d 855 (1972).
51 Id. at 333, 288 A.2d at 856.
52 N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 13: 10-1 to -2.6 (1977).
5360 N.J. at 333, 288 A.2d at 856. The Multiple Dwelling Reporting Rule, N.J.
ADMIN. CODE § 13:10-2.2 (1977) provides:
(a) The owner or owners of every multiple apartment development which
has 25 units or more shall file an annual report with the Division on Civil
Rights concerning the racial composition of the multiple dwelling and factors
affecting that composition.
Section 13:10-2.3 specifies the contents of the report:
(b) The report may include information concerning:
1. Racial designation of applicants for apartment rental;
2. Racial designation of apartment leaseholders;
3. Apartment rental turn-overs;
4. Apartment rental recruiting techniques;
5. Rental rates and apartment sizes; and
6. Such other information as the Attorney General determines is necessary to effectuate the purposes of this rule.
54 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(g)(3) (West 1976).
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practice mandated by the Multiple Dwelling Reporting Rule was itself unlawfully discriminatory and that any attempted enforcement of
the Rule by the Division would amount to a violation of the LAD. 55
The court did not accept this contention, and looked instead to
the underlying purpose of the LAD, 56 stating that "[w]here a literal
rendering will lead to a result not in accord with the essential purpose and design of the act, the spirit of the law will control the
letter.- 57 The court noted that the rationale for the Rule was that the
demographic information contained in the reports would point out
possible discriminatory practices to be investigated. 58 It concluded
that the reporting requirement fell within the scope of the Division's
rule-making authority, and therefore the agency's decision to imple59
ment the regulation was affirmed.
The supreme court also has looked to the underlying purpose of
the LAD when scrutunizing actions of the Director ostensibly taken
pursuant to his enumerated powers under that law. In Jackson v.
Concord Co.,60 the complainant was unsuccessful in his attempt to
lease an apartment from Concord. 6 1 He filed a complaint alleging racial discrimination. 62 The Division determined that the real estate
company had violated the LAD. 63 Although the LAD does not textually provide for such relief, 64 the final order issued by the Director
55 60 N.J. at 334, 288 A.2d at 857.
56Id. at 335, 288 A.2d at 857. Noting the outward "inconsistency" of the Division's
actions in imposing the rule, the court said "the fundamental purpose of the act will
provide the touchstone to resolve the dilemma." Id.
57Id. at 338, 288 A.2d at 859.
58 Id. at 335, 288 A.2d at 858. The reason for implementing the Multiple Dwelling
Reporting Rule appears in the rule itself. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:10-2.1 (1977) states:
"The provisions of this [rule] are adopted to enable the Division of Civil Rights to
study patterns of housing occupancy, investigate practices of discrimination and affirmatively administer the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination."
59 60 N.J. at 340-41, 288 A.2d at 861.
60 54 N.J. 113, 253 A.2d 793 (1969).
61Id. at 116, 253 A.2d at 794. Jackson, a black school teacher, was interested in
leasing an apartment close to his employment. Id. at 118-19, 253 A.2d at 795-96. Concord owned and operated the Hartford Arms apartment complex. Id. Jackson applied for
an apartment, but his application "met with a succession of incredible excuses and evasive replies ..., a tactic obviously designed to discourage him from pursuing the rental." Id. at 119, 253 A.2d at 796.
62 Id. at 119, 253 A.2d at 796.
63 Id. at 116, 253 A.2d at 794.
64 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-7 (West 1976) gives the Director, upon determining that
the LAD has been violated, authority to
issue and cause to be served . .. an order . . . to cease and desist from [any]
unlawful employment practice or unlawful discrimination and to take such affirmative action, including, but not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrad-
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included an award of compensatory damages "equal to the increased
rental and travel expenses resulting from [Jackson's] having to live
elsewhere." 6 5 Concord appealed the Director's decision to the
superior court, appellate division, 66 which set aside that portion of
the order relating to the award of damages. 6 7 The appellate division
assumed that the LAD's silence on the question was tantamount to a
lack of authority to grant such relief.6 8 The Supreme Court of New
Jersey reinstated the award of damages, holding that the legislative
history behind the LAD implied that the power to effectuate such
affirmative relief was within "the overall design of the act." 6 9
While there are numerous decisions by New Jersey courts discussing both the scope of the Division's role in remedying discrimina70
tory practices and the Director's authority to take appropriate action,
the supreme court, in Lige, indicated that the Director's imposition
of a remedial quota system pursuant to the statutory scheme presented
71
a novel interpretation of the LAD.
At the federal level a plethora of cases involving remedial quotas
has been decided. 72 Those circuits which have had occasion to review
ing of employees, . . . as, in the judgment of the director, will effectuate the
purpose of this act ....
65 54 N.J. at 117, 253 A.2d at 795.
6 Jackson v. Concord Co., 101 N.J. Super. 126, 243 A.2d 289 (App. Div. 1968).
67 Id. at 133, 243 A.2d at 292-93.
68 Id.
The appellate division "[found] nothing in the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination which clothes the Director with authority to award damages." Id. at 133,
243 A.2d at 292.
69 54 N.J. at 126, 253 A.2d at 800. The Jackson rationale was later reaffirmed in
Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973), wherein
compensatory damages for pain and suffering were awarded by the Division as part of
the relief granted from unlawful sex discrimination. 62 N.J. at 416, 301 A.2d at 763.
70
E.g., Passaic Daily News v. Blair, 63 N.J. 474, 308 A.2d 649 (1973); Zahorian v.
Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 62 N.J. 399, 301 A.2d 754 (1973).
71 72 N.J. at 17-18, 367 A.2d at 839-40. Although the validity of benign quota relief
pursuant to the Law Against Discrimination had not been determined until Lige, the
use of racial quotas as a means of restricting blacks had previously been condemned by
Justice (then Judge) Sullivan in Taylor v. Leonard, 30 N.J. Super. 116, 103 A.2d 632
(Ch. Div. 1954). Taylor involved a constitutional challenge to the use of a quota to limit
the number of black tenants in an Elizabeth, N.J., public housing project to roughly the
same ratio as that of blacks in the immediate population. Id. at 117-18, 103 A.2d at
632-33. This restrictive quota was premised on the theory that blacks were entitled to
no "more than their share of the available housing units" in Elizabeth. Id. at 119, 103
A.2d at 633. In reaching the conclusion that the quota system was unconstitutional,
Justice Sullivan found it "immaterial . . .that the quota . . .bears some relation to the
percentage of Negro population." Id.
72 E.g., United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors Local 5, 538
F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976) (33% black referral quota to trade employers mandated by long
history of excluding minorities from union membership); EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet
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the imposition of such relief pursuant to federal civil rights legislation
have determined that the Federal Constitution does not prohibit the
use of racial quotas in certain narrowly defined circumstances. 73 The
evolution of the modern federal view of "affirmative action" has paralleled the judicial expansion of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment.

74

At one time, the concept controlling all equal protection claims
regarding racial discrimination was the "separate but equal" doctrine
of Plessy v. Ferguson.75 Over a dissent by Justice Harlan, who maintained that the equal protection clause was "color-blind," 76 the Plessy
court upheld the validity of a racial classification, thereby acknowledging that color consciousness was constitutionally permissible.

77

Fif-

ty-eight years later the Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board of Education (Brown J),78 said that separate is inherently unequal, implicitly
accepting Justice Harlan's colorblind approach. 79 Brown I held that
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment requires
that children be afforded equal access to public educational opportunities irrespective of race. 80 However, the difficulties of implementMetal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 532 F.2d 821 (2(1 Cir. 1976) (29% minority membership goal
in union and apprenticeship program imposed based on finding of persistent pattern of
discrimination); Boston Chapter NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974) (upholding preferential hiring of qualified minorities found to have been discriminated
against on a one-to-one basis with all eligible persons on the Boston Fire Department
waiting list); NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (one black for one white
hiring quota imposed upon Alabama state troopers where continuing pattern of racial
discrimination found); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (oneto-two hiring quota of minorities to whites for positions in Minneapolis Fire Department until 20 qualified minorities were added to an all-white fire department); Germann v. Kipp, 429 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (preference plan for minorities and
women upheld against challenge of reverse discrimination where Kansas City Fire Department was making effort to fill available positions with under-utilized classes). See
also Slate, Preferential Relief inl Employqoent Discrimination Cases, 5 Loy. CHI. L.
REv. 315, 318-20, nn.8-10 (1974).
7'See note 72 supra.
74For an account of the development of the fourteenth amendment into a vehicle
for judicial policymaking, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977).

75 163 U.S. 537, 548 (1896) (Louisiana statute requiring railway companies operating
intrastate to provide separate compartments for whites and blacks held not violative of
the fourteenth amendment).
76 Id. at 559.

77See id. at 543-48.
78 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
79Id. at 495.
1o Id. Brown I dealt exclusively with the question of the constitutionality of segregated public schools. After determining that such a segregated school system violated
the Constitution, the Court requested additional briefs from counsel relating to the imposition of appropriate remedies. Id. & n.13.
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ing Brown I soon proved that colorblind remedies under a colorblind
equal protection clause were not efficacious. 8 1
By 1971, it had become clear that positive action was required to
remedy the practices found unconstitutional in Brown I. The Supreme
Court, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,8 2 de83
cided that a result-oriented racial awareness policy was necessary.
Thus, the use of numerical goals as a "starting point" in the effort
toward school desegregation was approved.8 4 In a case decided the
same day as Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg and involving similar
issues, the Court reiterated its result-oriented approach, stating that
"[j]ust as . . . race . . . must be considered in determining whether a
constitutional violation has occurred, so also must race be considered
in formulating a remedy." 85
Significantly, federal chancellors have often imposed racially
based employment quotas upon public employers where discriminatory employment practices in violation of the fourteenth amendment
have been shown. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in NAACP v.
Allen,"8 6 affirmed a lower court's imposition of quota relief upon a
finding that the Alabama Department of Public Safety had engaged in
a continuing pattern of racial discrimination in the hiring of state
troopers. 8 7 The court of appeals noted that while there is no constiBrown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955), formulated appropriate remedies intended to alleviate the unlawful segregation found in Brown I. Id. at 298. The Court
there remanded the individual cases to their respective lower courts to retain jurisdiction
while "requir[ing] that the defendants make a prompt and reasonable start toward"
integration. Id. at 300-01.
81 See, e.g., United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 854 (5th
Cir. 1966) (desegregation mandate not proceeding due to uncertainty of school boards
and lower courts as to the extent of their authority to act affirmatively), aff'd en banc,
380 F.2d 385, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967).
82402 U.S. 1 (1971).
83 See id. at 31. If, as the Court said, "[t]he task is to correct, by a balancing of the
individual and collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution," id. at
16, then "[slubstance, not semantics, must govern." Id. at 31. Quoting from Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968), the Swann Court reaffirmed the use of" 'a
plan that promises realistically to work, and . . . to work now.' " 402 U.S. at 31 (emphasis by the Court).
9 402 U.S. at 25.
85 North Carolina Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971).
86 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974).
8' Id. at 622; see NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703, 706 (M.D. Ala. 1972). In the 37
year history of the Alabama state troopers, no black had ever been hired as an officer,
493 F.2d at 616, although approximately 26.2% of the state's population was black. Id. at
617 n.3. Under those circumstances, the federal court felt that any neutral selection
procedure would perpetuate "the pervasive effects of past racial discrimination." Id. at
618. The district court had imposed a hiring quota of one black applicant for every
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tutional right to "proportionate representation in public employment,"'8 8 a district court "has 'not merely the power but the duty to
render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the
future.' "89

The appellate court viewed its role in Allen as a limited one,
involving the sole question of whether the district court had exceeded
its discretion in formulating an appropriate remedy. 90 While recogniz-

ing the federal courts' "nondiscretionary duty" 9 1 to eliminate all vestiges of racial discrimination, the court of appeals stated that this duty
does not always call for quota relief. 9 2 Under the test formulated by
Allen, it is only when "the chancellor determines that [the imposition
of a quota] represents the only rational, nonarbitrary means of
eradicating" unlawful racial discrimination, that such a decree would
be capable of passing "constitutional muster. '93 In addition, when the
quota relief is imposed, it must be "temporary . . . , seek[ing] to
spend itself as promptly as it can by creating a climate in which objective, neutral employment criteria can successfully operate to select
public employees solely on the basis of job-related merit." 94 According to the Fifth Circuit, once this goal has been achieved, continuation of the quota relief would be inappropriate. 9 5 Until then, how96
ever, the court implied that it would not rule out the use of quotas.
white applicant until approximately 25% of the Alabama troopers were black. 340 F.
Supp. at 706. Although not specified in the district court order, the Fifth Circuit assumed that the order related to qualified individuals only. 493 F.2d at 617.
ss493 F.2d at 618; accord, Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974);
see Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service Comm., 482 F.2d 1333,
1340-41 (2(1 Cir. 1973).
9493 F.2d at 617 (quoting from Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154
(1965)).
90493 F.2d at 620.
91 Id. at 617-18.
92 See id. at 619, 621.
931I.at 619.
94Id. at 621. The appellate court indicated that the district court may use discretion
in establishing the duration of the quota by retaining jurisdiction to insure compliance
with the original court order. See id. at 621-22. Once the intended results have been
achieved, the court is under a duty to terminate the extraordinary relief. Morrow v.
Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1974).
95See 493 F.2d at 621.
96 See id. Substantially identical results have obtained in other circuits which have
decided cases brought under civil rights legislation. E.g., Boston Chapter NAACP v.
Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017 (1st Cir. 1974); Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Comm., 490 F.2d
387 (2(1 Cir. 1973); Commonwealth v. O'Neill, 473 F.2d 1029 (3d Cir. 1973); Carter v.
Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.) (en Ianc), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Germann
v. Kipp, 429 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Mo. 1977).
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Not all courts, however, have so readily approved the use of
quotas. Kirkland v. New York State Department of CorrectionalSer-

vices 9 7 is a recent example of a case in which the imposition of quota
relief was deemed excessive. The Second Circuit, called upon to review the constitutionality of a promotional quota,9 8 noted that it had
approved the use of quotas in previous cases, 9 9 but called the imposition of numerical ratios "repugnant to the basic concepts of a democratic society." 10 0 The court of appeals reviewed the prior decisions
affirming quota relief, finding them distinguishable on their facts, and
noting that in those cases "clear-cut pattern[s] of long-continued and
egregious racial discrimination" were evident. 10 1 Relief in such instances was made less offensive, in the court's view, by the fact that
the quotas did not result in "identifiable reverse discrimination."'0 2
In Kirkland, however, the promotional quota would have "bumped"
white correctional officers who were in line for promotion to sergeant,
in favor of black and hispanic officers with less seniority. 10 3 The Second Circuit found that the district court order, invalidating the discriminatory promotional test and requiring the Department of Cor97

520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).

98 Id. at 423. After demonstrating a statistical case of discrimination, black and his-

panic correction officers within the New York State Department of Correctional Services
prayed for an injunction against the further use of the discriminatory civil service promotions exam. Id. at 422-23, 425. The district court granted the requested relief, id. at
423, and ordered the Department of Correctional Services to develop a professionally
validated test which would not discriminate against minorities. Id. Furthermore, all interim promotions were to be approved by the court to insure that "at least one out of
every four such promotions" went to minority officers "until the . . . percentage of
[minority] sergeants was equal to the . . . percentage of [minority] correction officers."
Id. Finally, the district court ordered the continued promotion of "at least one
[minority] employee for each [sic] three white employees promoted" even after the
nondiscriminatory selection procedure has been effectuated "until the . . . percentage of
[minority] sergeants [is] equal to the . . . percentage of [minority] correction officers."
Id.
99 Id. at 427; e.g., Patterson v. Newspaper Deliverers' Union, 514 F.2d 767 (2d Cir.
1975) (court approved consent decree requiring quotas for union membership); Rios v.
Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Local 623, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) (court affirmed
specific racial membership goal for union); Vulcan Society v. Civil Service Comm., 490
F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1973) (court affirmed numerical quotas for hiring New York City fire
fighters); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Service Comm., 482 F.2d 1333
(2d Cir. 1973) (court approved quota hiring of minorities for the Bridgeport Police Department); United States v. Wood Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973) (court approved consent decree requiring union to issue fixed
number of work permits to minority workers).
100 520 F.2d at 427.
101 Id.

102Id. at 427, 429.
103 Id.

at 429.
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rectional Services to develop a professionally validated exam, was
sufficient to eliminate the challenged discrimination. 10 4 Use of a quota
would have "constitute[d] court-imposed reverse discrimination with10 5
out any exceptional or compelling governmental purpose."'
While there has been no final judicial resolution of the constitutionality of remedial quotas, no court has yet declared outright that
their use is prohibited by the Constitution. Congress, however, has
been quite clear in its attitude toward this remedy, as expressed in
federal civil rights legislation.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) 10 6 was enacted
104 See id. at 428, 429-30, 431.
105 Id. at 430; see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971)

(discussed at notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text). In that case the Supreme Court
stated: "In seeking to define even in broad and general terms how far [equitable relief]
extends it is important to remember that judicial powers may be exercised only on the
basis of a constitutional violation." 402 U.S. at 16.
The policy that equitable relief should extend only as far as is necessary under the
circumstances was also recognized by the Fourth Circuit in Harper v. Kloster, 486 F,2d
1134 (4th Cir. 1973), modifying and aff'g Harper v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 359 F. Supp. 1187 (D. Md. 1973). Plaintiffs in that case appealed from an order of
the district court which denied their request for fixed racial quotas to remedy past and
present discriminatory hiring practices in the Baltimore Fire Department. 486 F.2d at
1135-36. The court of appeals affirmed those portions of the district court's order which
required the use of properly validated tests, the elimination of current eligibility lists,
the imposition of a three-year limit on seniority requirements for promotion to lieutenant, a one-year limit on seniority requirements for all other positions, and an absolute
preference for applicants who live within the City of Baltimore. Id.; see 359 F. Supp. at
1218-19 (full text of the district court's order).
The lower court had consciously applied the strict scrutiny approach toward racial
classifications, see Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944), and had failed to discern a compelling need in light of the
alternative hiring restrictions imposed upon the fire department. Thus, the request for
quota relief was denied. 359 F. Supp. at 1213-15. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, 486 F.2d
at 1136, calling the relief granted "complete in and of [itself]." Id.
Since most of the minority population centered around the City of Baltimore, 359 F.
Supp. at 1201, the actual effect of a city resident preference was to favor minority applicants. Although this type of remedy avoids the use of a controversial label such as
"racial quota," which, as Justice Pashman noted, "evokes a visceral response," Lige v.
Town of Montclair, 72 N.J. at 27, 367 A.2d at 845 (1976) (Pashman, J., dissenting), it still
has the effect of displacing one class in favor of another. However, this type of preferential relief may suggest a way to circumvent the constitutional problems of racial quotas.
Since the city resident vis & vis nonresident classification is not suspect in the traditional sense, necessitating merely the showing of a rational basis, preferential relief may
validly be imposed where a racial quota per se may not be justified under the particular
circumstances.
106Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 253, as amended by Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). For the background of Title VII and its role
in equal employment opportunity, see [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2355 (legis-
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for the purpose of eliminating all forms of employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.107 That legislation created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), whose primary function was to investigate charges of unlawful discrimination.' 0 8 In 1972, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act amended Title VI 1 0 9 so as to give the EEOC authority to engage
in active enforcement. 110 Specifically, the amendments included a
provision authorizing the use of affirmative action as a remedial device to end employment discrimination."' A proposed amendment
to the 1964 Act, prohibiting any preferential relief based on racial
criteria, was solidly defeated," l2 indicating congressional willingness
to accept some form of color conscious relief in actions brought under
Title VII.113
In United States v. International Union of Elevator Constructors, 1 4 the Third Circuit affirmed the use of a quota plan as part of a
court imposed remedy for a Title VII pattern or practice of
discrimination. 1 1 5 After determining that the union had violated Title
VII by its under-utilization of blacks, the district court ordered, inter
lative history and purpose); [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137 (amendments authorizing affirmative action).
10742 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970); see H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 26,
reprinted in [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 2391, 2401.
2
10842 U.S.C. §§ 000e-4, -5(a) (1970).
109 Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103
(amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-1 7 (1970)).
110 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975).
111 Id. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). The provisions of this section bear a striking
resemblance to the affirmative action provisions of the LAD. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-17 (West 1976), reprinted in note 37 supra, with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp.
V 1975) which provides:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in the
complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such unlawful
employment practice, and order such affirmative action as may be appropriate,
which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hiring of employees,
with or without back pay .... or any other equitable relief as the court deems
appropriate ....
No order of the court shall require the admission or reinstatement of an individual as a member of a union, or the hiring, reinstatement, or
promotion of an individual as an employee . . . if such individual was refused
admission, suspended, or expelled, or was refused employment of advancement
...for any reason other than discrimination on account of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin ....

(emphasis added).
112118 CONG. REC. 1661, 1676 (1972). The proposal was voted down 44 to 22. Id. at
1676.
113 See generally Slate, supra note 72.
114 538 F.2d 1012 (3d Cir. 1976).
115 Id. at 1018-20.
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alia, "a 23% black membership goal" and "a 33% black referral
quota." 116 The union appealed, charging that Title VII prohibits the
imposition of quotas. 1 17 The court of appeals rejected the union's contention, saying " '[a]ny [such] interpretation would allow complete
nullification of the stated purposes of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.' "118 In this case, as in a host of Title VII decisions by other
federal courts, the imposition of quota relief has withstood the argument that such a remedy is beyond the court's statutory or constitutional authority. 119

The Lige majority was not persuaded by analogous federal decisions. Basing its conclusion wholly on state law, 120 the Lige court
held that the use of a racial quota to remedy the effects of past dis116

Id.

117 Id.

at 1017-18.

at 1018. The union referred specifically to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970)
which provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of
compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system, or a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production or to employees who work in different
locations, provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to
discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, nor shall it
be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to give and to act upon
the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test,
its administration or action upon the results is not designed, intended or used
to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
538 F.2d at 1018. The union also claimed that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970) prohibited
the ordered relief. 538 F.2d at 1018. That section provides:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any
employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management
committee subject to this subchapter to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist
with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer, referred or classified for employment by any employment agency or labor organization, admitted to membership or classified by any labor organization, or admitted to, or
employed in, any apprenticeship or other training program, in comparison with
the total number of [sic] percentage of persons of such race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin in any community, State, section, or other area, or in the
available work force in any community, State, section, or other area.
118 538 F.2d at 1019.
119 Id. at 1020. Substantially identical results have obtained in other circuits in cases
brought pursuant to Title VII. E.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257
(4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 532 F.2d 821 (2d
Cir. 1976); Associated General Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974); United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir.
1973).
120 See 72 N.J. at 15-26, 367 A.2d at 838-44.
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crimination is the legal equivalent of the discriminatory practices
prohibited by both the LAD and the Constitution of the State of New
Jersey.' 2 ' While the court did not take issue with the underlying
purpose of the quota remedy, the majority felt that the "benign" ends
did not justify such malign means.1 22 Neither did the court question
the Director's power to effectuate appropriate relief for such discriminatory practices.' 2 3 However, the Lige majority read this "broad
remedial affirmative power" as applying solely to individual relief for
specific acts of discrimination. 124 The court noted that the LAD never
had been interpreted to permit the imposition of class quotas in an
effort to compensate "individuals against whom no discrimination had
been practiced."' 12 5 Addressing itself to the argument that Title VII
has been interpreted to permit the use of class quotas, the court cited
the Kirkland test adopted by the Second Circuit,' 2 6 apparently persuaded by the rationale that "a small identifiable non-minority group"
of persons should not suffer from an attempt to remedy a general
pattern of discrimination. 1 27 Such would have been the case had the
28
quota in Lige been approved.'
While not insensitive to the disadvantages which minorities must
overcome in obtaining employment, the Lige majority seemed to be
more concerned with the problems which reverse discrimination
might cause. 12 9 One of the difficulties perceived by the court was the
lowering of standards for those positions which would have been subjected to hiring quotas.
Although the new examination procedures for hiring and
promotions are to be non-discriminatory, the order permits a less

Id. at 23-24, 367 A.2d at 842-43.
Id. at 23, 367 A.2d at 842.
123 See id. at 17-18, 367 A.2d at 839-40.
124 Id.
at 17, 367 A.2d at 839. Speaking of the Director's authority under the LAD,
the court stated: "'This broad remedial affirmative power includes the right to take positive action which will operate prospectively to eliminate and prevent unlawful discrimination." Id.
125 Id.
at 18, 367 A.2d at 839. But see David v. Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345
(1965), where the supreme court referred to racial discrimination "as a public wrong and
not merely the basis of a private grievance." Id. at 327, 212 A.2d at 359. If the wrong is
indeed a "public" one, then it would seem consistent with the nature of equitable relief
to formulate a remedy which would appease the "public," not merely the individual
directly discriminated against.
126 72 N.J. at 19, 367 A.2d at 840; Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Services, 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975); see notes 97-105 supra and accompanying text.
127 72 N.J. at 19, 367 A.2d at 840.
121

122

128

Id.

129

Id.

at 21-26, 367 A.2d at 841-44.
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qualified black to be employed or promoted over a more qualified
white. .

.

. Inherent in the Division's orders is a rejection of the

concept that the more or most qualified should be hired and promoted. This rejection violates the fundamental precept in a democratic society that merit, not skin color, should determine an
individual's place in society.130

Furthermore, the court was determined to prevent what was perceived to be a potential for litigation brought by whites who would
inevitably be displaced by minority workers under a remedial quota

plan.' 3 ' The court was likewise fearful that, should employers be required to hire blacks in proportion to their number within the com-

munity, a precedent would be set for all other ethnic groups.' 3 2 This
would " 'lea[d] to insoluble problems and pil[e] discrimination on top
of discrimination.' "133
The court invalidated the impositions of hiring quotas by the
Director and held that the use of such remedies violated the New
Jersey constitution 3 4 and the Law Against Discrimination by discriminating against individuals solely on the basis of race.13 5 The majority

proposed a number of alternatives which could be used by the Division
3 6
to enforce the policy of the LAD without violating the constitution.'
These included job-related testing procedures, more active recruiting
in both high schools and universities, and pre-test orientation sessions

designed "to familiarize the applicants with the nature and type of
examination. '" 3 7 Equality of educational opportunity, 13 8 along with
attrition in the job market, would eventually allow the "unintentional
13 9
discrimination [to] be rectified."'
According to Justice Pashman's dissent, the Lige holding not only
deprived the Director "of an important tool in the arsenal of legal
130Id. at 22, 367 A.2d at 842 (footnote omitted). The Director's order, however,
referred only to qualified applicants-whether white or minority. Id. at 13-14, 367 A.2d
at 837.
131Id. at 23, 367 A.2d at 843; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12a (West 1976). This
statement assumes that the white applicant was qualified in the first place.
132 72 N.J. at 24, 367 A.2d at 843.
1331d. (quoting from the opinion below by Judge Halpern, Lige v. Town of
Montclair, 134 N.J. Super. 277, 281, 340 A.2d 660, 662 (App. Div. 1975)).
134 N.J. CONST. art. I,
5.
13572 N.J. at 26, 367 A.2d at 844.
136 Id. at 25, 367 A.2d at 843-44.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 21, 367 A.2d at 841. Just how this "'coequality
of opporunity [sic] in
education' " was to come about was not revealed. Id. at 43 n.l, 367 A.2d at 854.
139Id. at 25, 367 A.2d at 843-44.
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remedies for racial discrimination,"' 140 but also, and perhaps more
importantly, placed New Jersey in the position of being the only
jurisdiction which has held the use of hiring quotas, no matter how
necessary or benign, to be unconstitutional. 1 41 Apparently, Justice
Pashman felt the impact of Lige to be that racial classifications in New
42
Jersey are per se unconstitutional. 1
This exceedingly narrow interpretation of the state constitution
prompted Justice Pashman to state that "[i]t should be clear under
our own Constitution, as it has been under the Federal Constitution,
that the ideal of a color blind society does not rule out the recognition of racial factors in fashioning remedies. "'143 After interpreting
prior case law and the LAD as authorizing the use of racial quotas by
the Division, 14 4 the dissenting Justice demonstrated that quotas could
140Id. at 27, 367 A.2d at 845.
141 Id. at 35, 367 A.2d at 849.

Although some circuits have at times denied quota relief under particular circumstances, e.g., Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 520 F.2d
420 (2d Cir. 1975), no federal court of appeals has totally precluded the use of quota
remedies. Similarly, no state has invalidated quota relief in toto. Those recent state
cases which invalidated preferential quota plans have done so only after subjecting
them to some form of compelling interest analysis. Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18
Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977)
(setting aside 16 seats for disadvantaged applicants for medical school held not to have
met the requisite compelling state interest where university did not show that alternative means of achieving a valid state objective were unavailable); see Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center, 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976) (dictum to
effect that preference to minorities in university admissions is permissible where state
can show substantial interest, and gain to be derived outweighs possible detrimental
effects).
142 Id. at 52, 367 A.2d at 858; see id. at 23, 367 A.2d at 842. This view that the New
Jersey constitution is colorblind is not supported by New Jersey case law. In fact, several supreme court decisions have specifically approved of a racial awareness policy in
order to combat discriminatory actions. E.g., New Jersey Home Builders, Owners and
Managers Ass'n v. Blair, 60 N.J. 330, 288 A.2d 855 (1972) (discussed at notes 50-59
supra and accompanying text); Jenkins v. Township of Morris School Dist., 58 N.J. 483,
279 A.2d 619 (1971) (discussed at notes 30-44 supra and accompanying text); David v.
Vesta Co., 45 N.J. 301, 212 A.2d 345 (1965); Morean v. Board of Educ. of Montclair, 42
N.J. 237, 200 A.2d 97 (1964) (discussed at notes 19-26 supra and accompanying text).
143 Id. at 54, 367 A.2d at 859.
Justice Pashman argued that quota relief is permitted by the LAD in appropriate
circumstances. 72 N.J. at 29-34, 367 A.2d at 845-48. He felt that all the appropriate
circumstances were not present in Lige, however, since the town had revised its testing
procedures and was making efforts to eliminate discriminatory hiring and promotion. Id.
at 61, 367 A.2d at 863. Justice Pashman would have allowed Lige, and the other applicants who were denied jobs because they failed an invalid test, to be hired on a oneto-one basis with whites, but would terminate the quota order once those discriminated
against in the past had been hired. Id.
144 Id. at 29-34, 367 A.2d at 845-48.
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be "fai[r] and reasonabl[e]" when properly applied and controlled. 145
Referring specifically to the quota plan for Montclair, Justice Pashman considered "the quotas imposed by the Division on Civil Rights,
being limited in scope and operation, to be valid exercises of the
14 6
Division's remedial powers."
The dissent criticized the court's concern for the maintenance of
adequate standards in the Montclair Fire and Police Departments as
misguided, especially since the remedial order required the hiring of
only those black applicants who demonstrate sufficient occupational
qualifications by passing a validated test. 147 Justice Pashman questioned the validity of the majority's assumption that "imerit" is
synonymous with performance on a standard written exam. 148 He
noted that minority status might be viewed as a desirable qualification in certain areas of employment. 1 49 He also suggested that the
use of physical ability tests to determine job-related qualifications, at
least in the fire department, might be more appropriate than written
tests. 150
Finally, Justice Pashman reached the question of the validity of
remedial quotas under the fourteenth amendment of the Federal
Constitution' 5 1-a question the majority did not feel compelled to
consider.' 5 2 The Justice was of the opinion that article I, paragraph 5
should not have been accorded a construction more stringent than
the prevailing federal interpretation of the equal protection clause. 153
Under his analysis, a quota remedy pursuant to the LAD could
withstand judicial review, if a "strict scrutiny standard which [would]
examin[e] the risk that the terms of the quota will undermine the task
of undoing past discrimination, ' 1 5 4 were employed. As applied to the
Lige situation, this standard would be satisfied to the extent that blacks
Id. at 35, 367 A.2d at 849.
146 Id. at 41, 367 A.2d at 852.
147 Id. at 42, 367 A.2d at 853.
148 Id. at 41-46, 367 A.2d at 852-55.
145

149 Id. at 45, 367 A.2d at 854-55. This might be the case in minority neighhorhood
fire and police precincts desiring to utilize local residents as officers and firefighters.
Justice Pashman, however, acknowledged that this practice might cause more trouble
than it would be worth. Id. n. 13.
150 Id. at 45-46, 367 A.2d at 855
l5l Id. at 52, 367 A.2d at 858.
152 Id. at 25-26, 367 A.2d at 844.
153 Id. at 42, 367 A.2d at 858. See generally Ely, The Constitutionality,of Reverse
Discrimination,41 U. CHI. L. REV. 723 (1974).
154 72 N.J. at 58, 367 A.2d at 861; see Taxpayers Ass'n of Weymouth Tp. v. Weymouth Tp., 71 N.J. 249, 364 A.2d 1016 (1976).
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who were actually discriminated against were hired.' 55 The state's interest in effectuating the LAD did not necessitate a broader remedy
in this particular case, 15 6 but Justice Pashman refused to accept the
majority's conclusion that no set of circumstances could ever justify the
57
use of a quota.'
The court's invalidation, on constitutional grounds, of racial hiring and promotional quotas will preclude their use as a form of prospective class relief to remedy the effects of past discrimination. If
prompt achievement of the constitutional mandates is a measure of the
Division's effectiveness in accomplishing the purposes of the LAD,
then Lige is probably counterproductive.
Suits under Title VII and the prosecution of equal protection
claims remain alternative remedies which may collaterally result in
the imposition of quota relief, when deemed appropriate, under federal authority. Title VII, however, requires that the EEOC refrain
from assuming jurisdiction over an individual's discrimination charge
until any similar state agency, such as the Division, has had a reasonable opportunity to act.158 To the extent that the Division affords adequate relief to aggrieved individuals under the LAD, the EEOC may
effectively be foreclosed from assuming jurisdiction over the charge.
The number of opportunities for imposition of prospective class relief
in cases where an EEOC investigation might have revealed a longstanding pattern of racial discrimination necessitating the imposition
59
of a quota, may thereby be reduced. 1
15572 N.J. at 61, 367 A.2d at 862.
156 Id.
at 62, 367 A.2d at 863.
157

Id.

158 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. V 1975). This has been interpreted to allow an

individual to first file a charge with the EEOC, which forwards it to the appropriate
state agency. After a 60-day period has passed, the EEOC may automatically assert
jurisdiction over the same charge where the state agency has not acted on the charge or
has not found for the charging party. See Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1972).
See also 72 N.J. at 54 n.17, 367 A.2d at 859 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
159 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (Supp. V 1975).
The possible foreclosure of Title VII relief is most likely in those situations in
which the state renders an adequate remedy to the aggrieved person where there has
been no finding of discrimination against a class. However, since Title VII charges of
discrimination have often been interpreted to allege class discrimination, see, e.g., Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968), class relief has often been
predicated on the charge of an individual, despite the mootness of the charge. Parham
v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 428 (8th Cir. 1970). Although Title VII
relief is not necessarily precluded by the rendering of a state remedy, a detrimental effect
on Title VII may result. An individual who has received satisfactory relief from a state
agency not empowered to impose a quota, may be less likely to pursue further relief
under Title VII to obtain a quota to benefit his class.

19771

NOTES

The issue of the constitutionality of state imposed remedial
quotas is currently before the United States Supreme Court in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 160 Unless the Court
reaches the conclusion that such relief is not only constitutionally
permissible, but actually mandated by the fourteenth amendment,
Lige will continue to be controlling in New Jersey. As such, this decision represents the "formula for another generation of delay."' 16 1
Patterns of racial discrimination have been allowed to meld into
the political and economic fabric of society despite the clear prohibition of both federal and state constitutions. While it may be that the
elimination of employment discrimination of the character presented
in Lige does not necessitate the imposition of racial hiring and promotional quotas, the New Jersey supreme court's sweeping prohibition
of remedial quota relief under any circumstances seems somewhat
strained in light of federal experience. The court could have limited
the scope of its decision by subjecting the Division's quota relief to a
form of strict scrutiny test. This could have invalidated the Lige quota
without precluding the imposition of preferential quotas in order to
eliminate invidious forms of discrimination. Instead, the Lige court has
expressed its concern for upholding the letter of the law-failing, in
the process, to take account of the underlying objective of article I,
paragraph 5 and the spirit of the Law Against Discrimination. Clearly,
the authors of those laws were less concerned with protecting the
majority from discrimination against itself than they were with eliminating invidious discrimination as it has been practiced against minorities.1 6 2 Turning the product of this concern into a prescription for
freezing racially discriminatory patterns does not serve the purpose of
the constitutional provision or its implementing legislation.
Dominic Caruso
160 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S.

1090 (1977). Some clue as to the outcome of Bakke may have come from the Supreme
Court last term in the context of voter rights. In United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), the Court stated that racial considerations are permissible in order to correct past discrimination. Id. at 162-65. When state
action (racial classification in assignment of voters under a reapportionment plan) intends "no racial slur or stigma with respect to any race," id. at 165, but merely represents a lawful objective, such actions shall be subjected to a rational basis test rather
than the traditionally applied strict scrutiny. See id. Given this less stringent standard of
review, it would have been easier for the. Regents of the University of California to
have shown a rational basis for their actions.
161 72 N.J. at 62, 367 A.2d at 863.
162 See III STATE OF NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1947 (Committee on Rights, Privileges, Amendments and Miscellaneous Provisions and Committee
on the Legislative Record) 344-45.

